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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It’s the year 2030. The global population is inching closer to the 9 billion mark, 
which it is expected to reach in a mere 10 years. 47% of the population now lives 
in areas of high water stress. 1  Since 2012, the world’s need for food has 
increased by 50% and water by 30%. The livelihoods of people in low-lying 
regions are threatened by rising sea levels. Internal and cross-border migrants 
are at an all time high, increasing population pressures on already-stressed 
environments.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, is the region upon which climate change has 
taken the greatest toll due to multiple stresses and low adaptive capacities. By 
2020, 250 million people already suffered from water insecurity, and that 
number is estimated to double by 2050. Increased food insecurity and 
malnutrition have spread across numerous countries as yields from rain-fed 
agriculture, a main source of food for local communities, has reduced by 50%.2 
 
 This may be our fate; this may even be the best-case scenario if the international 
community continues to fail to act in the face of climate change. Throughout modern 
history, the human security of all people has never been threatened by an uncontrollable 
force on the scale by which it is threatened by climate change today. As the irreversible 
effects of climate change continue to strengthen their grip on the environment, the threat 
to human security will increase as populations will face competition and a threat to life 
due to the depletion of life-sustaining resources. If the international community continues 
to fail to take a preventive approach to threats to human security stemming from climate 
change, states, institutions and humanitarian organizations will increasingly struggle to 
address massive migration or increased instability. 
 Although the human security concept entered international dialogue in the 1990s, 
states and institutions have continued to employ the top-down approach to human 
security - an approach customary to traditional national security threats that stresses 
actions that states can take or policies states can implement to protect security. The top-
down approach has directed nearly all attention and efforts towards the reduction of GHG 
emissions to lessen future threats to international peace and security, although 
negotiations are currently at an impasse and have been for many years. GHG emissions 
are only a small piece of the puzzle, and do not address the human security implications 
of climate change that are occurring and will continue to grow.  
 This has resulted in a gap in the international approach to human security threats 
stemming from climate change- the absence of a fundamental bottom-up approach upon 
which the original concept of human security was founded. Civil society organizations, 
particularly those with a human development mandate, have the tools, expertise and 
experience to fill this gap in the international approach. However, engagement of civil 
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society in climate change dialogue remains sparse due to conceptual and institutional 
barriers.  
The first lies within civil society itself. Human security NGOs have adopted two 
separate components of the human security concept. Organizations that emphasize the 
human protection component, which prioritizes civil and political rights, have a 
prominent voice in the international arena and have been able to interject human 
protection concerns into the international agenda. However, human protection 
organizations do not yet emphasize climate change as a threat to human security. On the 
other hand, organizations that emphasize the human development component, which 
focuses on economic, social and cultural rights, stress climate change as a threat to 
human security but operate primarily outside of the international agenda. This is due to 
the acceptance of and consensus on civil and political rights within the international 
community versus economic, social and cultural rights that are still widely debated. This 
fine line between categories of rights is what lies at the root of the separate components 
of human security. This divergence existed within civil society prior to the introduction 
of the human security concept in the international community.  
 However, climate change is an unprecedented threat to human security that 
bridges both components and prevention cannot be effective without mutually-
reinforcing development and protection. If these threats can be effectively realized, a 
convergent approach to human security can occur. A convergence of components within 
civil society would increase its capacity to interject human security threats of climate 
change into the international agenda, primarily through human protection organizations 
that are deeply engaged at the international level, and would provide an array of tools, 
expertise and experience that are unique to human development organizations and 
fundamental to prevention. This is necessary because civil society cannot take up this 
task on its own as effective prevention requires resources and policy-making of states and 
international institutions and cooperation to facilitate information sharing and increase 
efficiency and effectiveness. The second barrier is institutional and prevents the 
engagement of NGOs in international dialogue thereby hindering cooperation. Both of 
these barriers can and must be broken.  
 This paper will deconstruct prevention of human insecurity by identifying 
inadequacies of the current international approach to human security threats stemming 
from climate change and providing policy prescriptions for how these gaps can be filled 
through engagement with civil society. This will be followed by an identification of 
barriers to civil society engagement and an analysis of tools that can provide a bottom-up 
approach to human security. Lastly, it will analyze the final and key component to an 
effective preventive approach to human security: cooperation.  
 As the effects of climate change become more pronounced, the time for 
preventive action dwindles. The detrimental impacts have already begun to take hold and 
will continue to do so. This is an unprecedented threat but also provides an 
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unprecedented opportunity for the international community to take a preventive role, 
rather than the traditional reactive role, to ensure the security of the world population.  
 
II. INADEQUACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO 
HUMAN SECURITY IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Forty-one years ago, the United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human 
Environment met in Stockholm, Sweden and determined that it was the “urgent desire” of 
all people and the “duty” of all governments to protect and improve the human 
environment.  
 
A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout 
the world with a more prudent care for their environmental consequences. 
Through ignorance or indifference we can do massive and irreversible harm to 
the earthly environment on which our life and well being depend.
3
  
 
More than four decades have passed and the same concerns are repeatedly uttered by 
world leaders, but this time, “massive and irreversible harm” has already been done.  
 The origins of the current approach to security lie in the articulation of the 
national security concept of the Cold War era, which prioritizes military threats to the 
state as a whole and “presupposes that threats arising from outside the state are somehow 
more dangerous to its security than threats that arise within it.” Responses to national 
security were framed almost entirely within a state-centric context, as what actions or 
policies the state could undertake to address threats. This concept was found to be 
inadequate in addressing post-Cold War security threats because it did not account for 
new realities such as the rise of prominent actors outside of the state and globalization. 
States began to realize the danger of “societal risks” as opposed to solely national dangers 
that can be addressed using military force.4 
 The traditional concept of national security evolved to incorporate collective 
security in which inter-governmental bodies, such as the European Union and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), played a much greater role in international 
relations. However, just a few years later in the early 1990s, the failure to prevent 
genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica, to address the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and 
to resolve the Gulf War through collective efforts led to a full reconceptualization of 
security. “Recognition that national security does not necessarily equate to better lives for 
most people gave rise to the concept of human security, which served to critique the 
effects of national security on human well-being.” 5  The human security concept 
incorporated threats “not only [to] human beings, families, and 
communities….but…humankind,” rather than solely military threats to national security.6 
 The purpose of the human security concept is as follows: 
4 | Page 
 
 
To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms 
and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms 
– freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical 
(severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using 
processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating 
political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that 
together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.7  
 
In 2003, the Commission on Human Security (CHS), which was created in 
response to the outcome of the United Nations Millennium Summit, prepared a guide for 
the human security concept that listed three ways in which the human security concept 
transformed traditional security. First, “traditional, state-centric conceptions of security 
that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression” were supplanted 
by a concept of security “that concentrates on the security of individuals, their protection 
and empowerment.” Second, the concept highlighted a “multitude of threats that cut 
across different aspects of human life,” thereby identifying the deep relationship between 
security, development and human rights. Lastly, the concept promoted a comprehensive, 
“coordinated and people-centered approach to advancing peace, security and 
development.”8 
 The CHS also identified five main features of the concept, each of which are vital 
to upholding human security in the face of climate change threats. These features include: 
people-centered, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented.  
 The prevention-oriented feature involves a dual-focus on protection and 
empowerment, which are mutually-reinforcing. Protection entails a top-down approach in 
which international actors, including states, have the primary responsibility, international 
and regional institutions, NGOs and the private sector implement systematic norms, 
processes and institutions to protect people from threats. 9  Complementarily, 
empowerment entails a bottom-up approach in which individuals and communities are 
enabled to develop resilience to threats, make informed decisions and participate in 
solutions to ensure human security for themselves and others.  
 To date, international approaches to the human security impacts of climate change 
remain solely within the realm of protection, employing a top-down approach through 
implementation of international policies. This approach does not keep pace with the rest 
of the globalized world. “Although a great deal of the substance of politics has been 
globalized, the process of politics has not. Its main institutions …remain rooted at the 
national level.” 10  This raises a serious problem as protection and empowerment are 
mutually-reinforcing and therefore are both “required in nearly all situations of human 
insecurity, though their form and balance will vary tremendously across 
circumstances.” 11  In addition, states have prioritized and focused nearly all of their 
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attention on mitigation, which is only one component of protection, and these policies 
have been unsuccessful to date, with current negotiations at an impasse.  
 Climate change is already negatively impacting the human security of vulnerable 
populations. Addressing only one root cause of the problem will not provide for a 
solution. In fact, the current approach focuses almost solely on reducing impacts decades, 
if not centuries, from now.  
There are three main gaps in the current international approach to human security 
implications of climate change: a prioritization of mitigation, a hierarchical 
categorization of human rights and a lack of preventive action due to the absence of 
international cooperation. This is not solely because of a failure of states to act, but also 
because their capacity for action to comprehensively address human security implications 
of climate change is simply inadequate. 
 
PRIORITIZATION OF MITIGATION  
The period of earth’s history since the industrial revolution has been deemed the 
“Anthropocene,” an era during which production and consumption patterns have had 
direct impacts on the earth’s system.12 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and aerosols, as 
well as natural drivers, produced by or resulting from human activities, are considered 
drivers of climate change, as they have altered the composition of the atmosphere and 
resulted in what is known today as climate change.13 It was not until more than two 
centuries after the start of the industrial revolution that states took collective action 
against anthropogenic drivers, which, by then, were already resulting in visible 
environmental degradation.  
The concept of environmental threats to security first emerged at the UN 
Conference on Human Environment in 1972, but it was not until the late 1980s that the 
environmental security regime began to develop. 14  In 1983, the discourse gained 
momentum when Richard Ullman, one of the first modern thinkers to garner attention to 
the link between the environment and security, redefined a “security threat” to extend 
from the military into the environmental realm. Ullman defined a threat as: 
 
An action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively 
brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or 
(2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the 
government of state or to private, nongovernmental entities within the state.
15
 
 
Within the first component of his definition, Ullman considered threats to include 
droughts, floods, epidemics, natural disasters, drastic deterioration of environmental 
quality or simply any “interruption in the flow of critically needed resources or, indeed, a 
dwindling of the available global supply.” 16  Just a few years after Ullman, Jessica 
Tuchman Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who 
was serving as founding vice president of the World Resources Institute at the time, 
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theorized that the “new security threats” that states would be confronted with in the future 
included population growth, resource scarcity and environmental degradation.17  
The consequences of anthropogenic drivers became undeniably clear in 1990 with 
the release of a report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
which was been formed by the UN Environmental Progamme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1998. The IPCC declared with certainty that 
human activities increase atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and result in a warming of 
the average global temperature.18 
To predict the implications of GHGs on the environment, the IPCC later 
developed a series of possible scenarios to project climate changes, which revealed that 
between 2090 and 2099 the average global temperature will have increased between 1.1 
and 6.4 degrees Celsius (2 – 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit) from 2000 levels. When adjusted to 
a “best estimate,” the range is scaled back to 1.8 – 4.0 degrees Celsius (3.1 – 7.2 degrees 
Fahrenheit). However, the wide variability in projections only occurs in the later part of 
the century. If calculating temperature increases between 2011 and 2030, all scenarios 
project an increase between .64 and .69 degrees Celsius. The primary effects of climate 
change include an increase in the global average temperature, warm spells and heat 
waves, heavy precipitation events, drought increases, extreme weather and sea level rise. 
In addition, each of these effects has and will continue to have impacts on human 
security.  
States took the first step towards mitigating these effects with the adoption of the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, through which 
countries committed to take steps to limit the average global temperature increase 
through GHG reductions and to cope with inevitable impacts. By 1995, countries realized 
that these reductions were inadequate and developed the Kyoto Protocol to legally bind 
countries to emission target reductions.  
Overall, more countries were successful in meeting their commitments during the 
first Kyoto Protocol commitment period, 2008-2012, than those that failed. However, the 
United States (US), a top contributor of GHG emissions, is not a party to the protocol and 
therefore has no obligation. Additionally, as developed countries were reducing their 
emissions during the first commitment period, emissions throughout the rest of the world 
increased drastically, especially in China, Brazil and other emerging economies. This 
resulted in more than a 10% increase in worldwide CO2 emissions, the primary 
anthropogenic driver of climate change, between 1990 and 2012. 19  Currently, 
negotiations for a second commitment period are at an impasse. 
Despite mitigation attempts, worldwide GHG emissions have not been reduced, 
which will result in greater impacts in the future. This top-down approach has been 
inadequate and has ignored the short-term impacts of climate change on human security, 
thereby ensuring an ultimate failure to prevent insecurity.  
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 HIERARCHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 As mentioned earlier, states have employed a protection-oriented approach to 
human security and neglected the mutually-reinforcing empowerment aspect. The 
protection focus is synonymous with the protection of “first generation rights,” or civil 
and political rights as defined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which are upheld by a state through inaction, meaning the state must simply 
avoid certain actions. Due to the fact that these are negative rights, that there is a general 
consensus on their articulation and that these rights are upheld through inaction rather 
than action, the human protection approach has been prioritized by states within the 
international community. Protection is more limited and therefore, theoretically, more 
feasible.20  
The empowerment focus, which emphasizes development, is synonymous with 
economic, social and cultural rights, or “second generation rights,” as defined in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). ICESCR 
rights are considered more ambiguous, which has posed a barrier to its inclusion in 
international dialogue. These are rights that governments must “progressively realize to 
the maximum of its available resources,” which has resulted in ambiguity as to how these 
rights can and should be fulfilled, how to measure progress, who is to be held 
accountable and what accountability mechanisms exist to ensure that they are upheld. A 
lack of consensus has resulted in economic, social and cultural rights remaining 
secondary to civil and political rights on the international agenda.  
Fuelling this ambiguity even more are the newly developed collectively-
developmental rights, or “third-generation rights.” 21  The adoption of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development resulted in this unofficial sub-group of 
rights being most closely associated with the impacts of climate change.22 Although the 
declaration is “soft-law,” it suggests that all humans have a right to economic and social 
development, a healthy environment, natural resources, intergenerational equity and 
sustainability, among other rights. The human rights implications of climate change have 
been increasingly contextualized within ICESCR rights. Unfortunately, to date, the 
human security impacts of climate change have been categorized as threats to economic, 
social and cultural rights, and in some cases as threats to collective-developments rights, 
which will prove to be a miscalculation. 
 The prioritization of protection by states and international institutions and the 
categorization of climate change threats as a concern solely for human development has 
resulted in the absence of climate change impacts on human security within the 
international human security dialogue.  
 
 LACK OF PREVENTIVE ACTION  
A top-down approach, which focuses on the prioritization of mitigation, and a 
failure to take collective action has resulted in a lack of preventive action in addressing 
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the negative human security impacts of climate change. Although the reduction of GHGs 
is a component of prevention in the long-term, it is only one component, and has failed to 
date. The consequences of stalled UNFCCC negotiations alone are going to be drastic, 
yet action from states to address already-occurring climate impacts on human security 
remains nonexistent.  
The Sahel is facing a drought that has increased economic and political instability, 
hunger, migration, and malnutrition, and which UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has 
deemed “a warning for all” as “the resilience of societies and systems will be tested [by 
climate change] in all regions.”23 Sea level rise has accelerated in the last decade, to 
nearly double that of the last century. 24  The average global surface temperature is 
progressively increasing, with the five hottest years on record since 1997 and the 10 
hottest since 1990.25 Ocean temperatures are gradually warming, resulting in more severe 
storms and hurricanes.26 An increasing number of extreme weather events are taking 
place each year. Seasons are shifting and the oceans are becoming more acidic.27 These 
consequences have and will continue to negatively impact life-sustaining resources, 
threatening human security.  
The impacts of climate change are not and will not be evenly distributed 
throughout the world.28 Although developed countries have contributed the greatest share 
of GHG emissions, both cumulatively and in recent years, developing countries that 
continue to struggle economically will face the brunt of consequences from those 
emissions. Developed countries only held a 20% share of the world’s population in 2004, 
yet they produced 57% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product based on Purchasing 
Power Parity (GDPPPP) and accounted for 46% of global GHG emissions.
29 
In addition, the capacity of a state to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate 
change “is dependent on socio-economic and environmental circumstances and the 
availability of information and technology,” thereby resulting in greater vulnerability to 
climate change impacts in economically weaker states, especially those facing multiple 
stresses.30 At a sub-state level, impacts are also likely to “disproportionately affect the 
poor” and pose a greater risk to less-developed areas.31 
This disproportionate balance of contributions and vulnerability is reflected in the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibility,” which recognizes historical 
differences in the contributions of developed and developing countries to climate change 
as well as their differences in economic and technical capacity to address the effects of 
climate change. In an attempt to address this discrepancy, states and international 
institutions have established numerous funds to assist vulnerable countries with 
adaptation. These various funds were the first concrete step by states to attempt to 
address human security impacts of climate change by acknowledging varying 
vulnerabilities and promoting sustainable development through adaptation, not only 
mitigation. However, greater analysis shows that these attempts have been nearly as 
unsuccessful as UNFCCC negotiations. 
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The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was established in 1991 to support 
sustainable development initiatives by providing grants for projects related to 
biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, ozone depletion and 
organic pollutants. In regards to climate change specifically, mitigation projects have 
focused on reducing or avoiding GHG emissions through renewable energies, energy 
efficiency, sustainable transportation and the management of land use, land-use change 
and forestry. Projects have targeted developing countries to promote immediate and long-
term adaptation measures through policies, plans, programs, projects and actions. One of 
the key components of the GEF is that it has strived to partner with not only states and 
international institutions, but also civil society organizations and the private sector. 
Unfortunately, the GEF has been criticized for employing a top-down approach, a lack of 
timeliness, failing to involve local communities in project implementation and decision-
making, and not correcting the balance between developed and developing countries, as 
there is no requirement for developed countries to contribute funds despite “differentiated 
responsibilities.”32 
The GEF also oversees two other funds. The Special Climate Change Fund 
(SCCF) was created to finance initiatives for adaptation, technology transfer, capacity 
building, management of energy, transportation, industry, agriculture, forest and water as 
well as economic diversification. The second fund, Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF), supports least developed countries to prepare and implement National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), which are reports submitted by states to 
identify urgent and immediate needs for adaptation measures in hopes of preventing 
increased vulnerability or costs at a later stage. However, it has been found that NAPA 
processes face the same constraints on effectiveness and legitimacy as other national 
planning processes, particularly in consultation processes that tend to have a narrow 
focus and be unrepresentative or exclusive to certain stakeholders.33 In the absence of 
citizen and civil society engagement and democratic structures, sustainable adaptation 
and resilience to climate change is little more than rhetoric.34 A bottom-up approach is 
absent but is necessary to ensure “that the immediate needs and concerns of the most 
affected communities are included in the list of projects for funding under NAPA.”35 
Another fund, established under the Kyoto Protocol, the Adaptation Fund finances 
adaptation projects in developing countries that are vulnerable to effects of climate 
change.  
 The largest of the funds, the Global Climate Fund (GCF), which was created 
within the UNFCCC framework in 2010, aims to engage relevant institutions and 
stakeholders within countries receiving funding in order to determine where mitigation 
and adaptation funding should be targeted. The fund has the potential to bridge the 
technology gap between developed and developing countries- another disadvantage 
facing vulnerable states as they do not have the resources or technologies to reform their 
own policies and practices.  
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In theory, the varying climate funds are on the right path. However, the lack of 
timeliness, poor project planning, poor funding and a top-down approach has led to a 
failure to effectively and efficiently address the human security impacts of climate 
change.  
As stated by Don Eberly, founder of the Civil Society Project, “There is a 
dawning recognition that in a ‘flattened’ and decentralized global environment shaped by 
local innovation, the standardized bureaucratic approaches get in the way of progress.”36 
The over-prioritization of mitigation and the failure of preventive adaptation policies, 
both stemming from a top-down approach, highlight the inadequacies of the current 
international approach to climate change.  
Every day that preventive efforts fail, the implications of climate change grow. 
Current trends “endanger the survival of humankind.” 37  As former Japanese Prime 
Minister Mr. Takco Fukuda stated during the InterAction Council High-Level Expert 
group meeting, “The Interrelated Problems of Environment, Population and 
Development” in 1985. “Effective cooperation is a prerequisite for human survival.”38  
Nearly three decades later after Fukuda’s statement, effective cooperation has yet 
to exist. The current approach taken by states is “much too narrow view of what 
environmental politics is, and ought to be, about,” 39  as stated by Robert Garner, a 
political theorist at the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom who has focused 
his studies on the environment. There is a need to look at the role of non-state actors, 
including civil society organizations, and their role in addressing climate change threats 
to human security. Garner has built on this by saying, “This leads us away from a focus 
on states and international negotiations towards a focus on civil society, and a strategy to 
create a more environmentally aware citizenry.”40 
 
III. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: THE MISSING LINK  
 
In the early years of the post-Cold War era, the world began to globalize not only 
economically, but also socially. Globalization opened up a space in the international 
forum for civil society to grow transnationally, and the concept of security evolved to 
reflect the changing international dynamics. Civil society organizations (CSOs) play an 
important and dynamic role in international affairs, based on their claim to the interests of 
individuals. Many modern CSOs emerged to function as a counterbalance to the state, 
employing a bottom-up approach to represent the interests of certain populations or 
groups. Throughout the past decade, non-governmental (NGOs), a form of civil society, 
have played an increasingly important role at the international level in compelling action 
from states and international institutions. Unlike international political processes that 
remain state-centric, CSOs “have proved well able to adapt to working in strong global 
organizations and networks.”41 
The concept of civil society is widely debated and has evolved over centuries. 
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Within the context of climate change, humanitarian NGOs, at the local, national, regional 
and international levels and the scientific community have the potential to fill the current 
human security gap in the international debate on climate change. However, humanitarian 
NGOs have remained absent in international dialogue, and both humanitarian and 
scientific organizations have yet to effectively realize their complementary roles. 
Approaches, priorities, experiences and tools of humanitarian NGOs are adequate and 
necessary to address current and prevent impending human security threats stemming 
from climate change.  
 
BOTTOM-UP APPROACH 
 A bottom-up approach lies at the core of the human security concept and is the 
foundation of modern civil society. The purpose of most modern CSOs is to represent the 
unheard voices of a certain population or amplify the voice of a particular group to 
increase their influence, thereby fulfilling its primary purpose of countering the state. 
Within the context of climate change, a bottom-up approach to human security is 
necessary to effectively address varying sub-state vulnerabilities. 
 
The analysis starts with people first and works backward to understand the 
circumstances, social, cultural and ecological threats, challenges, vulnerabilities 
and risks that render them insecure and may contribute to conflicts or 
cooperation. Focusing on human vulnerabilities, and then working back to 
understand the causes of those insecurities is an approach that differs from the 
earlier phases although it builds on many of their insights.42 
 
In addition, a bottom-up approach allows for the engagement of stakeholders. To date, 
the small role that states and international institutions have played in adaptation has 
focused primarily on what scientists and experts believe to be the best policy option and 
has a top-down thought process. However, environmental concerns are only one 
component within a complex system and additional factors must be considered. Past case 
studies have shown that engagement of stakeholders in public policy making is of 
“utmost importance…since many new policies can only be effective and successful if 
they are accepted by the majority of affected people.” 43  In addition, past cases of 
cooperation between citizens and experts has shown that citizens are much more capable 
in dealing with complicated social and technical questions.44 “Solutions to many complex 
problems are found through more, rather than less, interaction between citizens and 
experts” and “nowhere are the conflicts between citizens and experts more salient than in 
environmental politics.”45  
 Frequently, CSOs have served as the mediator between local citizens and top-
down government policies. The ability of NGOs to better understand circumstances and 
vulnerabilities through a bottom-up approach has the potential to not only increase the 
effectiveness of public policies but strengthen the resilience of a community and foster 
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development that can withstand the impacts of climate change.  
 
FILLING GAPS IN RESEARCH 
The employment of a bottom-up approach by NGOs can assist in filling gaps in 
the current regime through the inclusion of experiential knowledge as well as evidence 
and analysis from stakeholders. As mentioned above, research has been primarily 
scientific within the international community, in terms of adaptation to and mitigation of 
climate change. Within academia, the relationship between climate change and human 
security has been analyzed and critiqued relentlessly through the use of 
methodologically-criticized case studies, theoretical approaches and quantitative analysis 
of a wide array of indicators.  
In summation, theorists, scientists, researchers and academics have developed 
wide varieties of graphs, explanations, and theoretical relationships between human 
security and climate change. The reality is that human insecurity stemming from climate 
change will manifest differently within all populations, environments, and political and 
economic systems. Attempting to theorize what the effects and impacts will be is a 
starting point, but it is time to reach beyond theories as the impacts are already taking 
place. Neither an academic approach nor a solely scientific approach are sufficient 
“because they exclude the complexity of the interactions between nature and humans that 
can be neither modeled nor predicted.”46 A more holistic perspective is required. Citizen 
participation and stakeholder engagement can “provide new knowledge – in particular 
local knowledge – that is inaccessible to more abstract empirical methods.” 47 Academic, 
scientific and stakeholder input are all necessary components to successful protection and 
empowerment of human security, but stakeholder input currently remains absent and lies 
within civil society.  
NGOs focusing on conflict prevention, food security, water security or migration, 
to name a few areas impacted by climate change, can share qualitative, quantitative and 
experiential knowledge through a bottom-up approach. This can assist actors in 
determining what types of projects and policies have and have not been successful in 
addressing human security issues, to provide a case-by-case analysis of human security 
contexts, to serve as a liaison between policy-makers and stakeholders, and to be the 
voice of powerless vulnerable populations.  
 
EMPHASIS ON PREVENTION 
Lastly, and most importantly, civil society’s emphasis on prevention is a 
necessary but an absent component in current dialogue. The impacts of climate change 
will not wait for the international community to find a solution or reach an agreement. 
Civil society’s emphasis on prevention and early response is necessary in order for states 
to protect human security, now and in the future. 
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While states and international institutions have focused primarily on the 
protection component of the prevention-oriented feature of human security, NGOs 
collectively employ a dual focus on protection and empowerment. This involves 
mandates directed for protection, primarily of human rights, which entails promoting 
accountability for violations, increasing transparency, and monitoring and assessing 
policy implementation, among other roles. Mandates for empowerment stress the 
importance of development and capacity-building.  
The inclusion of NGO approaches to prevention would emphasize early action to 
increase resilience and adaptation rather than the traditional reactive response, thereby 
resulting in a more cost-effective approach that encourages a comprehensive strategy for 
human security and fosters cooperation and information sharing. NGOs could also 
provide tools, best practices and experiences, expertise and information that states and 
international institutions are incapable of ascertaining.48  
 
TOOLS AND EXPERTISE 
Cooperation and experience, as well as emphasis on a bottom-up approach, have 
led to the development and improvement of a wide array of civil society tools for the 
protection of human security, of which many, if not all, are applicable to prevent the 
threats of climate change to human security. It has been found that “NGOs often have 
much better analytical and technical skills and capacity to respond more quickly than 
government officials.” 49 Of course, this is dependent upon the resources and funding 
available to the NGO. In particular, there are two tools that should be considered vital to 
the protection of human security in the context of climate change including 
context/conflict assessments and crisis mapping, which will be reviewed in a later 
chapter. 
 
IV. BRIDGING DIVERGENT APPROACHES  
 
Human security is deeply engrained in the work of humanitarian NGOs through 
human development, which is synonymous with the empowerment aspect of human 
security, and human rights, which is synonymous with the protection aspect of human 
security. However, when the concept of human security entered international dialogue, it 
had already been well-established in the work of humanitarian NGOs. While there is not 
a “hierarchy” of human rights within civil society, the same disconnect between the 
empowerment and protection aspects of the human security concept that exist in state and 
international institutions are also present within civil society.  
 
In all this freedom from want suggests the provision of essential food, water and 
shelter, while freedom from fear suggests the absence of political violence and 
oppression. Climate change is now frequently discussed as a threat precisely 
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because it may disrupt food supplies and through storms in particular directly 
endanger shelter and health too (Webersik 2010). Likewise there is very 
considerable literature that expresses concern that such disruptions will induce 
violent conflict, although the social science research suggests that much of this is 
alarmist (Kahl 2006), nonetheless security agencies are now frequently using 
such arguments in their analyses of potential future conflict.50 
 
These two divergent approaches taken by NGOs are reflective of the top-down 
approach to protection and bottom-up approach to empowerment. As mentioned earlier, 
responsibility for prevention-oriented protection lies primarily with states to establish 
norms, processes and institutions to protect people from threats. NGOs employing a 
protection approach strive to increase accountability for state actions, compel leaders to 
implement policies for human protection, pressure violator states amidst other similar 
roles. Since there is a general consensus on civil and political rights and they are negative 
rights, NGOs saw an opportunity to interject themselves into the international dialogue 
and emphasize “sovereignty as responsibility,” through which sovereignty is no longer 
conceptualized as a protection against interference but rather an obligation to protect their 
population. As a result, NGOs have approached the human security concept from two 
divergent paths: development and human rights. 
While divergent approaches may have been beneficial in some regards, climate 
change is an unprecedented threat to both protection and development. When analyzing 
the human security implications of climate change, all aspects of human security are 
interdependent. The impacts of climate change on human security straddle the divide 
between the two approaches, as a force that will negatively impact current and past 
development projects, especially those focused on hunger, poverty, health, livelihood, 
and migration, and that could result in a threat to human survival, both due to conflict and 
physical health, as well as enjoyment of basic human rights.  
Empowerment and protection are mutually reinforcing aspects of human 
insecurity prevention. Human rights are fundamental to development and development is 
a key to prevention of human rights violations. Development that does not account for the 
future impacts of climate change could result in human protection being compromised or 
could “undo decades of development efforts,” as stated by the World Bank Group in 
2003. Both development and protection are fundamental to human security, especially 
when addressing climate change threats.  
 The human development and human protection components of human security are 
not only complementary, but have overlapping concerns in terms of climate change. 
Humanitarian NGOs that employ divergent approaches to human security must realize 
that climate change poses a threat to both human protection and human development or 
preventive efforts will remain fruitless and a time will come when prevention is a lost 
cause. 
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 A brief analysis of the primary concerns of human development and human 
protection NGOs sheds light on overlapping concerns, which can serve to merge the 
human development and human protection components within civil society.  
 
 
FIGURE 1: OVERLAPPING CONCERNS OF TWO APPROACHES TO HUMAN SECURITY 
(CREATED BY AUTHOR) 
 
 Although the concerns of development organizations stretch beyond the factors 
listed above, the concerns of protection organizations tend to be specific. There are three 
primary concerns stemming from climate change that both protection and development 
organizations have routinely focused on in the past: survival (or life), migration and 
conflict. When development and protection organizations can collaborate to address the 
survival, migration and conflict implications of climate change, not only will they be 
acting preventively, but they will have more power to do so in light of cooperation and 
shared resources and knowledge. 
Human survival is threatened by the negative impacts of climate change on the 
most basic levels: life-sustaining resources such as food and water. most basically by 
negative impacts of climate change on life-sustaining resources- food and water, which 
are intrinsic to survival. Increased temperatures, heavy precipitation events, warm spells 
and heat waves, droughts and sea level rise will each have a distinct negative impact on 
these resources. Additionally, external factors, such as growing populations, increased 
economic demand for natural resources and degradation of water sources from human 
activities, will add further pressures to already stressed systems.  
One of the primary means by which populations cope with threats to survival is 
through migration. Climate change is driving and will continue to drive migration, 
whether it is historical migration, forced migration, internal displacement, cross-border 
migration or urbanization. Migration, in all its forms, will have additional implications 
IDENTIFYING OVERLAPPING CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERNS 
OF THE TWO APPROACHES TO HUMAN SECURITY 
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for stability, primarily by increasing stresses on societal divides and infrastructure. In 
addition, population movements, coupled with expected population growth, can serve to 
further exacerbate food and water insecurity or instability.  
 Food insecurity, water insecurity and migration can all serve as contributing 
factors to violent conflict, whether small scale, intrastate or interstate. Quantitative and 
analytical studies have continuously attempted to prove and disprove relationships 
between the environment and conflict. While the relationship is still unclear, when 
looking at solely small scale conflicts within sub-Saharan Africa, environmental factors, 
whether it be access to drinkable water, rights to land upon which people are dependent 
for their livelihood or migration due to land degradation, it is clear that the environment 
can play a contributing role to violent conflict, at least at the local level. The growing 
impact of climate change will only exacerbate these tensions. 
In order to understand why and how a comprehensive conceptualization of human 
security is necessary within civil society, the following section will analyze the impacts 
of climate change on overlapping concerns of human development and human protection 
NGOs.  
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FIGURE 2: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR OVERLAPPING HUMAN SECURITY CONCERNS 
(CREATED BY AUTHOR; RESOURCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECTS: IPCC WGII 9.4, 2007) 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS FOR OVERLAPPING HUMAN SECURITY CONCERNS  
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V. DECONSTRUCTING PREVENTION: CIVIL SOCIETY TOOLS TO 
TRANSFORM RHETORIC INTO REALITY 
 
 The implications of climate change are stark and the international community’s 
failure to address human security threats is nothing short of immoral. The world 
continues to globalize but the concept of the “international community” has failed to 
adjust at the same rate. A world once dominated by states and international institutions 
must now adjust to the reality that international, regional, national, sub-national and local 
civil society organizations as well as private sector actors are all dynamic components of 
international relations. This recent reality can either be harnessed to make prevention of 
human insecurity attainable, or can be ignored to later face the ever-mounting 
consequences of inaction. 
 If civil society is able to converge the components of human security in the face 
of climate change and interject human security concerns into the climate change 
dialogue, a cooperation-based approach can be taken to address human insecurities 
stemming from climate change. Cooperation allows for the tools, resources and expertise 
of all global actors to be employed, fosters information sharing and best practices, and 
opens the door to the implementation of effective adaptation and preventive measures 
before it is too late.  
 Among the vast selection of tools within civil society, two tools in particular will 
play a vital role in the prevention of human insecurity and timely and efficient reaction to 
crises, in cases in which preventive efforts failed or never existed.  
 
 
19 | Page 
 
 
FIGURE 3: PREVENTIVE V REACTIVE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS 
(CREATED BY AUTHOR; RESOURCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECTS: IPCC WGII 9.4, 2007) 
 
 
PREVENTIVE V REACTIVE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS 
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PREVENTIVE CRISIS MAPPING 
 Tools that were once incredibly expensive and only available to a small number 
of professionals have entered the field of humanitarian assistance in the past decade. The 
rise of citizen journalism, social media and advanced technologies has facilitated 
information sharing on an unprecedented scale, resulting in the current generation of 
crisis mapping, which allows NGOs to gather data on unfolding crises. Such essential 
data can increase the timeliness of a response and target humanitarian aid and assistance 
as well as project implementation.  
 While a few notable organizations have been able to harness this technology, 
“there is also evidence that current humanitarian practice has not been able to take 
advantage of the new technologies and partnerships offered by the network age to share, 
manage, understand and then act on information in an effective and timely way.”51 For 
example, in 2011, early warning signs of famine in the Horn of Africa did not allow 
sufficient time for effective action, resulting in thousands of avoidable deaths.52 One of 
the prominent issues was a lack of information sharing, thereby posing “a significant 
barrier to response and to partnership.”53 
 In order to stay relevant and strengthen preventive efforts to the best of their 
ability, humanitarian organizations must adapt to the changes in technology, “to the 
increasing volume and complexity of information in the network age, and to the many 
new actors involved in using that information.”54 One of these new actors happens to be 
the private sector, which has not only utilized crisis mapping, but has been one of the 
leaders in its advancement. Palantir, a software company composed of primarily 
engineers, was founded with the purpose of assisting organizations with data and analysis 
for humanitarian causes and, simply, “to make the world a better place.”55 Additional 
actors include regional organizations, localized civil society in the form of associations, 
local groups, or a collection of people with an interest, academic circles, and the media, 
amongst others.  
 Advanced technologies, one of which is crisis mapping, have rendered the 
traditional meaning of “humanitarian assistance” irrelevant. What once referred to “a 
small group of established international organizations, often based in or funded by high-
income countries providing help to people in a major crisis” is now an outdated view.56 
Rather, crisis response now consists of a decentralized global system of citizens, 
organizations, states and international institutions. 
 Each of these developments is not only relevant to the protection of human 
security but is a necessary component of prevention. Effective information sharing and 
mapping of insecurity levels can assist NGOs, governments and other actors to target 
international aid, implement adaptation measures, track forced environmental migration 
and provide warning signs of a crisis.  
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STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Mapping takes many different forms and serves many different purposes. At a 
state-level, mapping data can assist to identify countries that will be most affected by and 
are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, primarily through the analysis of 
scientific data and development indicators.  
David Wheeler, Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development, published a 
working paper on “Quantifying Vulnerability to Climate Change: Implications for 
Adaptation Assistance,” in which he developed a data set for the physical impacts of 
climate change on each country and their vulnerability, or ability to cope with the 
changes. Wheeler first analyzed the direct state-level risks for agricultural production 
loss, extreme weather and rising sea level. He then incorporated data to account for the 
country’s ability to cope with those climatic changes and his analysis revealed that Africa 
would be disproportionately vulnerable.57 
The findings of Wheeler reflect those of the IPCC, which determined, based on 
numerous studies, that Africa is “one of the most vulnerable continents because of the 
range of projected impacts, multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity.”58 Predictions 
made by the IPCC regarding regional patterns and impacts of climate change are made 
with greater confidence, and can therefore better identify particularly vulnerable systems, 
sectors and regions.59  
Within Africa, the primary physical effects of climate change include droughts, 
warm spells and heat waves, a rising sea level, higher temperatures, and heavy 
precipitation events. Each of these effects will negatively impact food and water 
insecurity. Unfortunately, the current state of water and food security in Africa does not 
provide for a promising outlook in the face of climate change.  
The IPCC predicted with high confidence in 2007 that by 2020, just seven years 
from now, 75 to 250 million Africans will be exposed to increased water stress, and 
yields from rain-fed agriculture, a primary source of food for many rural communities in 
sub-Saharan African, could be reduced by up to 50%, adversely affecting food security 
and exacerbating malnutrition. Approaching the end of the 21
st
 century, sea level rise will 
affect low-lying coastal areas with large populations, for which the cost of adaptation 
could amount to at least 5-10% of GDP.60 These predictions are likely to occur whether 
or not states reach an agreement to reduce GHG emissions for a second commitment 
period within the UNFCCC.  
As of 2010, Africa was the only region in which a majority of countries had less 
than 75% of the population using improved drinking water sources. Six out of the seven 
countries worldwide with less than 50% improved sources of water were sub-Saharan 
African countries: Niger, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Mozambique and Madagascar. 61  Although Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 7, 
which is to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking-water and basic sanitation,” was the first goal to be achieved on a global scale, 
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averaging the achievements of all countries. When broken down by region, only 61% of 
the total population of sub-Saharan Africa use improved water sources.62  
The second component of MDG7 is to increase the percentage of the population 
using improved sanitation facilities. As of 2010, only 31% of the population used 
improved sanitation facilities, 23% in rural areas and 42% in urban. A lack of sanitation 
facilities is one of the primary contributors to “unimproved” drinking water sources. Of 
course, this is not necessarily due entirely to a lack of initiatives- economic, political and 
social factors must be considered as well. In terms of water resources, attention has been 
brought to the discrepancies between rural and urban access to drinking water, 
highlighting varying vulnerabilities of sub-state populations.  
Populations residing in rural areas tend to have a higher poverty rate and a lower 
rate of access to improved drinking-water sources. Currently, more than eight out of ten 
people worldwide who do not use improved drinking-water source live in rural areas.63 
Within sub-Saharan Africa, more than 70% of impoverished people reside in rural areas 
and the region also has the highest incidence of extreme rural poverty.64 Nearly 85% of 
the sub-Saharan population without improved drinking-water sources resides in rural 
areas. Figure 6 illustrates the magnitude of the gap between urban and rural access to 
drinking water: 64% of the total population resides in rural areas yet only 49% of rural 
populations have improved drinking-water sources.  
 
FIGURE 4: RURAL VS. URBAN IMPROVED DRINKING-WATER ACCESS  
(WORLD BANK, 2010) 
 
With an estimated 40% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa lacking improved 
drinking-water sources and an increased demand for water resources in recent decades 
due to a growing population, climate change is expected to further exacerbate water 
insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has predicted that in just 12 
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years, 1.8 billion people will be living in countries or regions with “absolute” water 
scarcity, and two thirds of the populations will be under “stress” conditions.65 When 
accounting for population growth, it has been predicted that .4 to 1.7 billion Africans 
alone will experience increased water stress, and by 2050, that number will reach 
between 1 and 2.7 billion.66  
 
SPATIAL DATA ANALYSIS 
It is clear that vulnerabilities may vary within a state and even from community to 
community. Therefore, a state-level analysis is not adequate as it generalizes a population 
that may have groups at opposing ends of a security spectrum. Spatial data has been a 
progressive step towards pin-pointing vulnerabilities. In 2010, a study entitled “Global 
threats to human security and river biodiversity,” used scientific spatial data to identify 
populations at risk of water insecurity. The authors aimed to provide a worldwide 
synthesis with the goal of “prioritizing policy and management responses to the [water 
security] crisis.”67  
The 2010 study, "Global Threats to Human Water Security and River 
Biodiversity," is an example of how spatial data can be incorporated into the human 
security approach to climate change. For NGOs or states that wish to implement 
development projects focused on water security, this data can help to identify a starting 
point.  
However, this analysis was based primarily upon scientific data. While that is a 
necessary component, it fails to consider community resilience, thereby excluding vital 
components: whether or not the community actually reports that they suffering from 
water insecurity, if successful adaptation has taken place or if there are economic barriers 
to security, to name a few. It should be mentioned that this was not the intention of 
authors and therefore not a flaw. Rather, in order for a spatial analysis such as this to be 
used for effective prevention, further steps are necessary.  
Water insecurity is closely linked to food insecurity. The sub-Saharan African 
region is particularly vulnerable to climate change because of the widespread dependence 
on rain-fed agriculture for sustenance - comprised of 96% of the population - and for 
livelihood - comprised of 70% of the rural workforce.68 As a result of the bleak state of 
food security in sub-Saharan Africa, researchers and organizations have begun to map 
sub-state data to identify internal vulnerabilities and increase the accuracy of data. This 
will be a necessary component in addressing insecurities as internal vulnerabilities can be 
drastically divergent.  
Already, about 25% of the world’s degraded land is in Africa. 69  Although 
agricultural production has increased in recent years, the environmental toll has been 
severe, due in part to poor water and soil resources, the lack of fertilizer, seeds and 
irrigation technologies, and regressive policies that result in degradation or support 
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unsustainable resource use. In addition, increased production has not compensated for the 
growing population. Per capita agricultural output is only 56% of the world average.  
Undernourishment and hunger still run rampant throughout sub-Saharan Africa 
despite the Millennium Development Goal 1 to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 
Since 1990, the percent of undernourished people in sub-Saharan Africa has only 
decreased by 4% and the absolute number of underweight children has risen steadily for 
the past twelve years, due in part to a growing population. Per capita consumption has 
progressively decreased over the past few years and would be even lower without food 
imports.70  
Events throughout recent years, including the financial crisis, spike in food prices 
in 2008 and droughts, have driven more people into poverty and hunger.71 In 2007 and 
2008, a food price crisis arose as a result of droughts in grain-producing countries and 
rising oil prices. Within just two years, from 2006-2008, average world prices for rice 
rose by 217%, wheat by 136%, corn by 125% and soybeans by 107%. As a result, global 
progress towards achieving MDG1 has “slowed and leveled off” since 2007-2008.72 
Nearly four years later, in 2012, Maplecroft’s Food Security Risk Index revealed 
that of the 197 countries surveyed worldwide, 30 of the 59 most at risk for food 
insecurity were sub-Saharan African states. Maplecroft warned that low crop yields had 
pushed global food prices up by 6% in July 2012, adding to the concern of a repeat of the 
2007-2008 food crisis. Nine of the eleven countries at “extreme risk,” the highest rank, 
were in Africa, including Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which were 
ranked together in first, Burundi (4
th
), Chad (5
th
), Ethiopia (6
th
), Eritrea (7
th
), South Sudan 
(9
th
), Comoros (10
th
) and Sierra Leone (11
th
). Aside from drought, sources of food 
insecurity included rising prices and declining production of corn from the United States 
and other countries, as well as conflict and instability. The concern of another major food 
crisis in Africa has been echoed by the UN as well.  
The impacts of climate change will pose another barrier to development in sub-
Saharan Africa. An increase in erratic weather patterns and continued land degradation 
will negatively affect crop yields. By 2020, it is expected that yields from rain-fed 
agriculture could be reduced up to 50% in some sub-Saharan African countries.73 This 
will have particularly adverse effects on smallholder farmers, most of which are located 
in rural communities and provide the vast majority of agricultural production.74 Overall, 
land suitable for agriculture will be reduced by 6%, thereby by decreasing GDP by 9%.75 
A rural-urban divide, similar to that in water insecurity, has already begun to appear in 
levels of food insecurity.  
 
SUB-STATE LEVEL SPATIAL DATA ANALYSIS 
Sub-state level analysis begins to put mapping on track towards greater accuracy. 
In an attempt to understand sub-state vulnerabilities, Olivia Grimm and Albrechy 
Ehrensperger from the Centre for Development and Environment, and Boniface Kiteme 
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from the Centre for Training and Research in ASAL Development, gathered data and 
used a bottom-up approach through consultation with stakeholders to identify sub-
national levels and drivers of food insecurity. Their findings confirmed that state-level or 
global analysis is not accurate because “reasons for food insecurity are multidimensional 
and not always related to the volume of food production or the consumer prices of food 
items.” Therefore, it is necessary to understand the levels and drivers of food security at a 
sub-national level since they vary from community to community.76 They found that the 
drivers of food insecurity and mitigation techniques are “highly context specific.”77  
 Two of the most notable and beneficial components of this study are the 
attempted use of a bottom-up approach, by engaging stakeholders through interviews and 
group discussions, and the inclusion of cross-disciplinary experts. Five European, three 
African and two Central American institutions collaborated on this study, and individual 
contributors included professionals from environmental, political, economic sciences, 
geography, agronomy and engineering disciplines.78  
Similar data mapping is performed on a regular basis by The Famine Early 
Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), creating one of the most progressive 
approaches to food security. FEWS NET has staff members in numerous Africa countries 
who are the “eyes and ears” of the project and collect and analyze data as well as travel 
and work in the field to keep up to date with the current situation. Data is updated 
monthly for countries at great risk of famine, and usually updated at least quarterly for 
most countries in which FEWS NET operates. Data is released in a public report for use 
by policy-makers all over the world.  
Of course, there are ways in which both of these methods of data and information 
gathering could be improved to ensure a bottom-up approach. Much of the information 
used by FEWS NET is quantitative, which may be due in part to the frequency of data 
gathering, a limited number of individuals on the ground or other factors. In order for this 
to be updated for the use of tracking human insecurity stemming from climate change, 
additional qualitative data would be necessary to better identify the specific needs of 
communities or drivers of food insecurity. 
 Grimm, Ehrensperger and Kiteme could have performed interviews and group 
discussions. Although they engaged local individuals, this consisted primarily of “rural 
advisers or officers from irrigation, agriculture, gender and social development offices at 
the district level,” and therefore does not necessarily represent the population. While it is 
a daunting and difficult task to reach beyond political or community leaders, it is 
essential in many circumstances as it cannot be guaranteed that officials represent the 
thoughts, ideas and sentiment of individuals or groups within the community. 
Additionally, a cross-disciplinary approach is beneficial, but in this case, failed to include 
civil society or development professionals, both of which play a key role in food security.  
 Despite gaps in methodology, studies such as these are essential to preventing 
food and water insecurity. Next steps would include the creation of a centralized 
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database, cooperative participation from NGOs to report on insecurities, development of 
reporting mechanisms for individuals currently without access to the Internet or mobile 
devices, and partnerships with a team similar to a SBTF that has the capability to 
spatially map and analyze the data.  
 
REAL TIME DATA 
To date, the most advanced crisis mapping initiative on climate change is the 
Climate Change and African Political Stability Program (CCAPS), developed by the 
Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at 
Austin in partnership with AidData. The mapping tool enables users to “visualize data on 
climate change vulnerability, conflict, and aid, and to analyze how these issues intersect 
in Africa.” For example, different layers of data allow you to visualize how conflict 
patterns could exacerbate insecurity in a region vulnerable to climate change or see how 
conflict has shifted over time. It also provides data on aid-funded interventions, which 
has the possibility of providing insight into whether or not development assistance is 
effectively reducing vulnerability. This tool was a breakthrough in the field and sets the 
groundwork for the road ahead. Adopting a tool such as this for application on a greater 
scale has the potential to drastically strengthen preventive efforts.  
The map below includes a base layer with spatial data for climate vulnerability, 
which incorporates physical exposure to climate-related hazards, population density, 
household and community resilience and governance and political violence. The red 
markers map the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED), which is 
updated on a monthly-basis and includes location, date, actors for fatalities from battle 
events, transfers of military control, headquarter establishment, civilian violence, and 
rioting. Lastly, black markers identify aid projects in place using data from the Malawi 
Aid Management Platform, the World Bank.  
 The map allows for a large-scale view but also a sub-state view with relatively 
accurate mapping of data. However, its purpose is primarily to identify conflict patterns 
and their relationship to climate change-based vulnerability. In addition, aid data is only 
available for certain years and is not available for years after 2010.  
A mapping tool for the prevention of human insecurity would have to be a 
centralized and coordinated effort within civil society. There are also many new 
technologies that could assist in providing up-to-date data and information. 
Improvements would need to include more extensive and timely data as well as 
cooperation with a wider variety of actors. Just over the past five tears, a breakthrough in 
real time data collection was made, now termed “crowdsourcing.”  
 
CROWDSOURCING 
Natural Language Processing (NLP), which aggregates data and information from 
news and social media outlets to provide collective data about an unfolding crisis, was 
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the first monumental merge between Geographic Information Systems (GIS), which map 
geo-spatial data, and social media and the internet. A few years later, in 2008, 
crowdsourcing was introduced to gather information from the ground and is now 
“primarily [used as] a tool for agencies to decide how to help people, [and] it must be 
understood as a product, or service, to help affected communities determine their own 
priorities.”79 Crowdsourcing takes two forms: (1) information is aggregated directly from 
affected communities; (2) data and information is outsourced to volunteers at a location 
outside of the affected community.80 Crowdsourcing has been used primarily for disaster 
response.  
 As post-election violence began to unfold in Kenya in 2008, a mapping platform 
called Ushahidi was set up by Patrick Meier, who is now a lead figure in the field of 
crisis mapping. Ushahidi is an free, open-source platform that can be viewed by anyone 
across the world to give them access to data and information in the form of a spatial map. 
The original use of Ushahidi in Kenya was to crowdsource reports of violence and map it 
in real time. People in Kenya had the option to fill out an online form to describe the 
events that they were seeing or send a text message via standard messaging services 
(SMS), to report violence. The Ushahidi platform has since evolved and as a crisis 
unfolds, volunteers assemble to form a Standby Volunteer Task Force (SBTF) and gather 
messages, photos, videos and satellite imagery to map on the Ushahidi platform. These 
volunteers form a decentralized network located all over the world that mobilize when a 
crisis occurs. In preparation for the 2013 Kenyan elections, the Uchaguzi platform was 
established to promote a “free, fair, peaceful and credible election process.” Reports were 
gathered via SMS, Twitter, through the use of the “#uchaguzi” hash tag, Facebook, email, 
and the web-based platform. Data and information was mapped in real time by a SBTF 
and transmitted to volunteers and election monitors on the ground in Kenya to verify 
reports and monitor incidents of violence, fraud or other disruptions. The initiative 
engaged local civil society, official NGOs, governments and local election monitoring 
groups and gathered information through both forms of crowdsourcing. The Ushahidi 
platform has since been used by other organizations on a smaller scale to track reports of 
rape in a country, track human trafficking and other humanitarian issues.  
 More recently, crowdsourcing has taken new forms. An example is a map that 
gathered data from Twitter to evaluate the “potential of Twitter as a source of time-
stamped, geocoded public opinion data in the context of the recent popular uprising in the 
Middle East.” Todd Mostak created this database to perform real-time analysis and 
visualization of certain Twitter tags. This is now being made into a public web interface 
called “Tweetmap” in collaboration with Ben Lewis who heads the WorldMap Initiative 
at Harvard’s Center for Geographic Analysis. Todd Mostak has also already used his 
Tweetmap for live crisis mapping. Meier responded to the creation of this map by 
exploring whether or not socio-economic trends, such as poverty and unemployment, can 
be captured via Twitter.  
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Following extensive research on the emerging field of crisis mapping, the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) came to conclusion 
that “The most appropriate and effective systems are typically those that draw upon 
technologies that are already common in a country, and ones the people from all walks of 
life are familiar with,” which tend to be low-cost and easy to use technologies. The 
establishment of FreedomFone, a system that collects data through voice over the phone, 
has been found to be useful in areas of low literacy. This tailoring of digital tools to local 
contexts “increase[es] the ability of technologies to be participatory and increase[es] local 
ownership,” as stated by the UNDP.81  
 
REACTIVE CRISIS MAPPING 
Crowdsourcing is the key to effectiveness and efficiency in the current model of 
crisis mapping. It allows for real time analysis and employs a bottom-up approach, 
supporting the fact that “communities know best what works for them,” as stated by 
OCHA.  
As of 2012, African countries that are expected to face the brunt of global climate 
change constituted more than half of the top 14 countries ranked on the Failed State 
Index as the most instable or on the brink of failure.82 Added instabilities of food and 
water scarcity will only exacerbate current situations, and are likely to result in secondary 
impacts including migration and, in certain circumstances, violent conflict.  
If employed properly, crisis mapping has the potential to map migration patterns 
stemming from climate change. This can assist NGOs in accurately targeting 
humanitarian aid in a timely manner to communities and cities unable to meet the needs 
of a large-scale influx of migrants, and can identify common patterns of migration to 
assist NGOs in efficiently implementing development and resilience projects in 
communities and cities expected to grow in population size.  
MIGRATION 
 Migration will be a severe consequence of climate change and the international 
community must be prepared for changes in migration patterns. The IPCC stated that the 
single greatest impact of climate change would be on human migration induced by both 
climate processes, which tend to be slow-onset processes such as sea-level rise, 
desertification or increased water scarcity, and climate events, such as flooding and 
hurricanes.
83
 The most widely accepted prediction of migration induced by climate 
change was proposed by Professor Norman Myers of Oxford University, who stated that 
there would be 200 million climate migrants by 2050. However, all estimates admit that 
predictions are unclear and unpredictable. “The history of migration literature as a whole 
shows that theoretical positions come and go with as much regularity as the population 
flows themselves.”84 
 Currently there are no international mechanisms, processes or legal documents 
that address the issue of climate-induced migration. In fact, there is not even an agreed-
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upon term for this form of migration. According to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), “environmental migrants” are:  
 
persons or groups of persons, who, for compelling reasons of sudden or 
progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living 
conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or chose to do so, either 
temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or 
abroad.85  
 
 Currently, there is an ongoing debate on the issue of how to classify population 
movement associated with the environment. Many academics have used the term 
“environmental refugee” to express the urgency of environmentally-induced migration. 
However, migration on the bases of environmental drivers does not fall within the 
international legal definition of “refugee” and it is unlikely that it will ever be accepted as 
such by states and international institutions due to its ambiguity and the prioritization of 
political and civil rights. That does not mean it is not an urgent issue, but is an 
unprecedented form of migration that will not be as noticeable as typical patterns because 
climate change is a slow process but will result in the same magnitude of migration as 
sudden-onset crisis in the long-term. 
 While climate migrants do not fit within the refugee category, per say, they also 
do not fit within the traditional definition of migrants. Historically, many populations, 
especially rural or pastoral communities, have considered seasonal or temporary 
migration to be a regular event. However, this entails the ability to return to the place of 
origin. As the impacts of climate change strengthen, land degradation may prevent 
populations from returning. A study on migration triggered by drought in Somalia 
published by The Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations and 
IOM entitled “The State of Environmental Migration 2011,” shed light on numerous 
factors constraining migration, including growing population in rural areas, competition 
for land and water, ecological damage to resources and restricted mobility across political 
boundaries.” 86  This has led to the introduction of the term “forced” environmental 
migrant, to emphasize the fact that the migrant has no other choice but to migrate in order 
to survive or sustain their livelihood, which is usually a basis for survival.  Forced 
migration emphasizes the roll of “push factors,” including environmental degradation, 
water and food scarcity or a threatened livelihood to name a few, which the IOM has 
argued are the main contribution to a migrants decision to flee. “Pull factors are of course 
a component, but it is likely that they would not flee simply because of pull factors,” 
which are primarily economic factors.87  
 In support of this, case studies have found that in many instances most individuals 
are not interested in leaving their community unless it isas a last resort, and they would 
return if possible. Traditionally, seasonal migration allows for populations to return.  
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 Within sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries, these migratory shifts 
will likely take place within national borders. In the context of the disproportionate 
vulnerability of impoverished and rural populations, it is expected that “increased food 
and water scarcity due to climate change in rural areas will accelerate the dramatic rural-
urban shift in the developing world.” 88  The internal characteristic of forced climate 
migration is due primarily to economic constraints, as it “typically requires access to 
money, family networks and contacts in the destination country.”89  
 This urban shift will have consequences of its own, many of which will be similar 
to the primary impacts of climate change; food and water insecurity. Currently, about one 
third of the developing world’s population, 1 billion people, lives in urban slums with a 
lack of clean drinking-water sources, sanitation and other health, educational and social 
services.
90
 Climate change combined with regular migration patterns is expected to result 
in this number rising to 1.7 billion by 2030. With an influx of people into already 
unstable or unhealthy environments and weak infrastructure, conditions should only be 
expected to worsen.91 “Over the short term, climate change forced migration will make 
the Millennium Development Goals harder to achieve. Over the long term, large-scale 
climate change migration could roll back much of the progress that has been made so 
far.”92 Unfortunately, without proper preventive measures, forced climate migration will 
likely feed a cyclic pattern between environmental degradation and migration.  
Many of these shifts will be inevitable over time, however crisis mapping and 
data analysis can play a vital role in addressing migration. More recently, new 
crowdsourcing techniques have been successfully tested that pave the way in the future of 
crisis mapping, most notably by Flowminder, a company that has uses location data from 
mobile phones to visualize and predict population movements after major disasters. After 
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Flowminder analyzed the movement of 1.9 million mobile 
phone users by comparing population locations before and after the earthquake. 
Remarkably, the predictability of population movements remained high and increased 
during the three-month period after the earthquake 93  “The findings suggest that 
population movements may be significantly more predictable than previously thought,” 
Linus Bengtsson and Xin Lu, co-founders of Flowminder, as well as Petter Holme, a 
colleague of the co-founders, stated in their report on predicting populations after the 
earthquake. 94  Satellite imagery has also been used to track population movements, 
although not as accurately. For example, in 2011, a SBTF partnered with UNHCR and 
Tomnod in Somalia to scan satellite imagery and tag over a quarter of a million features 
that looked like shelters of internally displaced persons (IDPs). This was completed 
within just 5 days.95  
Tracking migration patterns in early stages of climate change-induced crises can 
help to identify rural and urban areas with the greatest population influx. This provides 
guidance to NGOs when determining where to target aid or implement development 
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projects. NGOs can assist in preparing urban infrastructure for increased population 
growth in order to prevent increased or exacerbated food and water insecurity.  
A tracking system as robust as Flowminder is a worthy goal, but previous 
generations of crowdsourcing can also serve as a starting point. This would involve 
gathering information from local individuals, groups, and NGO’s as well as sub-national 
actors, via reports, SMS, or social media outlets and map the collected data. Sources 
could report noticeable out- or in-migration, whether slow patterns or mass movement. 
This would allow NGOs to investigate reasons for migration and target aid to primary 
migration destinations.  
Additionally, in cases of extreme climate events, such as floods or droughts that 
result in sudden-onset migration, crisis mapping platforms, similar to Ushahidi, can assist 
NGOs, governments and international institutions in targeting humanitarian relief and 
aid. 
Crisis mapping and data analysis remains a new and developing field within the 
humanitarian context, and has plenty of room for growth and improvement. There are 
particular risks to accuracy and effectiveness, one of which is participation bias in 
crowdsourcing. This can be due to varied availability of reporting mechanisms or societal 
divides within a country. It is estimated that 70% of the African population have mobile 
phone subscriptions and there was a significant increase in cellular penetration in the top 
20 countries that receive international humanitarian assistance.96 However, it must be 
taken into account that subscriptions may be unevenly distributed amongst societal 
divides, such as economic or geographical differences.  
Participation bias can also stem from societal structures, such as gender 
inequalities. In addition, internet penetration is incredibly low, with only 13% of the 
population having access to internet in 2011.97 Additional risks that have been discussed 
by practitioners and are now being addressed include information overload, unmet 
expectations, unverified data, and privacy concerns regarding public data, particularly for 
fear of retribution violence.  
Increasing access to reporting mechanisms, developing initiatives for improved 
access or identifying alternative modes of reporting are steps that NGOs, governments or 
the private sector can take as a first step in prevention of human insecurity. Communities 
are capable of monitoring local hazards and vulnerabilities, which is information that can 
assist other actors if it properly collected. New technologies, such as crisis mapping, can 
“provide key conflict prevention actors…with a level of localized information not 
previously available.”98  
A vital component to this strategy is context assessment, a method used by 
humanitarian organizations to ensure a bottom-up and conflict-sensitive approach 
through stakeholder engagement when implementing projects and initiatives or delivering 
aid. As Patrick Meier stated, “the frontline of humanitarian action has always consisted of 
communities helping themselves before outside aid arrives.”99  
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CONFLICT ASSESSMENTS 
 Large-scale population movements have the possibility of increasing instability 
and are recognized by the UN Security Council as a “threat to international peace and 
security,” particularly if there are already ethnic and social tensions.100 The IOM has 
stated that forced climate migration “will redraw the ethnic map of many countries, 
bringing previously separate groups into close proximity with each other and in 
competition for the same resources.”101 This is just one of the many means through 
which climate change could lead to violent conflict on a small or large scale.  
 Researchers, academics, governments and international actors have explored the 
relationship between the environment and violent conflict for many decades in hope of 
reaching greater understanding and increasing prevention. Theory and research on this 
relationship has been discussed through four different scientific perspectives; determinist, 
empiricist, skeptics and deniers. Determinists claim that climate change will lead to 
wars.102 Empiricists stress that climate change has and will contribute to forced migration 
and small-scale violence.103 Skeptics simply debate and point to a lack of evidence in 
peer-reviewed and quantitative literature.104 And, deniers challenge the links between 
climate change and security threats, claiming that it is a concern of development rather 
than security. Unfortunately, not one of these perspectives accurately analyzes the 
impacts of climate change.  
Since the beginning of conflict prevention theory, researchers have identified and 
disproved links between different factors over and over again with no one theory being 
entirely correct because there is no formula to the outbreak of conflict. While all of these 
developments have helped to shoulder progress in conflict prevention, none have 
provided the answer to the question they were out to solve; how can we predict and 
prevent conflict? Attempting to theorize if and how environmental factors contribute to 
conflict is a starting point, but it is time to reach beyond theories. Ultimately, only one 
reality exists- that human insecurity stemming from climate change will manifest 
differently within all populations, environments, and political and economic systems. 
In the past year, reports from the ground have led many researchers and 
academics to believe that “adaptation may be more of a cause of conflict than climate 
change itself,” as stated by Simon Dalby during an interview for this paper.105 This seems 
to be a repeated theme. Steven Heywood, who formerly worked at the Quaker United 
Nations Office in Geneva to study the relationship between water resources and conflict, 
reiterated this relationship.  
 
I think there is a possibility of adaptation and mitigation measures leading to an 
increase in tension and conflict, if they are done with largely commercial or 
monetary motivations and fail to take into account the needs of local people in 
the areas where adaptation and mitigation projects are taking place.106  
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 One of the most noted cases to date is reviewed by Prosper Matondi, Kjell 
Havnevik and Atakilte Beyene in their book, “Biofuels, Land Grabbing and Food 
Security in Africa.” The introduction of biofuel production was originally seen a climate-
friendly form of mitigation and adaptation as it has energy and environmental benefits 
through reducing dependence on GHG-producing oil. However, biofuels have also led to 
“land grabbing,” also termed “climate colonization,” in which primarily commercial or 
state actors rush for control of African land. "Contemporary land grabbing is shrouded in 
similar attitudes about unexplored, underutilized and uninhabited African land. This 
echoes in a subtle way the past colonization of Africa. Worse in the current context, 
however, is the existence of willing participants on the African side who negotiate 
concessions for foreign interests under a veil of secrecy, and often in alliance with 
domestic actors.”107 Other motives have included economic development from foreign 
investment. However, the theory that there are large amounts of land in Africa that are 
underutilized or not utilized at all is a mistaken perception. Rather, as was stressed earlier 
in this paper, arable and irrigable land is limited due to climate change and environmental 
degradation.  
The negative effects of biofuel production lies primarily with rural and agro-
pastoral communities, a group also disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate changes. One of the many issues that have been made clear with increased land 
grabbing is a failure to include stakeholders in the process. The authors cite the push for 
production of biofuels in Ethiopia as originating “primarily with global demand and the 
private sector, and not with local or rural needs.”108 In Tanzania, numerous land grabs 
have resulted in the displacement of farmers. Most of these land grabs take place in rural 
communities, in which a large majority of the population is dependent upon their own 
land for the production of food. In the case of Ethiopia, it is clear that a “major 
shortcoming of the current policies and strategies that promote biofuels is that they are 
not framed in relation to rural development and the livelihood needs of the rural 
areas.”109 Rather large-scale adaptation measures are implemented primarily on the basis 
of “commercial or monetary motivations,” as stated by Heywood, and “fail to take into 
account the needs of local people in the areas where the adaptation projects are taking 
place.”110 
 Ultimately, the lack of acceptance from rural communities could lead to a failure 
of biofuel adaptation projects as these projects are implemented primarily within rural 
communities. The authors noted that rural customs, practices, processes and institutions 
much be taken into account, governance must be addressed, social dynamics must be 
considered, and rural communities must not be seen as a homogenous group. The OCHA 
has stated that “communities know best what works for them; external actors need to 
listen and model their responses accordingly.”111 
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 It is not that land grabbing will lead to conflict, per say, but rather to stress the 
importance of a bottom-up approach in order to prevent human insecurity and conflict. 
Biofuels have been successful in northern Ghana, where socially responsible strategy and 
a participatory investment approach involved local populations and accounted for land 
use patterns, population density, and local livelihoods.112  
 Conflict, in and of itself, poses the most serious threat to human life, stability and 
development. As Heywood said, “We need to be looking into what we can do now to 
avoid conflict ever happening rather than waiting for it to happen then trying to fix it.”113 
Any potential for conflict should be heeded with caution and preventive efforts should be 
taken. Using a bottom-up approach to human insecurity, particularly food and water 
insecurity, can mitigate the social impacts of climate change and serve to prevent 
instability, migration and, in certain circumstances, conflict.  
To date, international approaches to adaptation have been led by the scientific 
community, which, generally tends to employ a one-size-fits-all approach. This is not 
adequate to address the impacts of climate change due to the fact that impacts, resilience 
and external contributing factors vary widely between communities, just as was seen in 
the 2012 study by Grimm, Ehrensperger and Kiteme. For many years, NGOs have 
worked to develop conflict assessment tools, also referred to as conflict assessment tools, 
to ensure that intervention programs and projects are sensitive to the context in which 
they are being implemented. Performing a conflict assessment can identify underlying 
interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships that may not be regularly visible. 
In the case of biofuel production, conflict assessments can assist all stakeholders in 
understanding the context in which the project is being implemented and how it can be 
most successful while also diminishing harmful and unintended impacts.  
Within the context of climate change, conflict assessment tools can be used to 
transform a bottom-up approach into a reality, through engagement of stakeholders and a 
multi-dimensional analysis of the context. This tool can assist to accurately identify 
insecurities and to determine the most suitable adaptation projects and initiatives for each 
community.  
The origin of the modern use of conflict assessments lies in the Do No Harm 
(DNH) debate launched by Mary Anderson in 1994. Anderson brought attention to the 
fact that humanitarian and development aid may do more harm than good in certain 
circumstances. Since then, numerous organizations have developed their own context 
assessment tools, most notably the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID) and 
the World Bank. However, smaller NGOs have also made their own assessment tools. As 
there is no single assessment tool that is applicable to all projects, contexts or conflicts, 
organizations develop tools that are specific to the type of projects they will be 
implementing. 
Generally, conflict assessment tools are best applied as part of a cyclic process, 
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which includes assessment, project design, implementation, monitoring, and adjustments. 
This helps to measure the negative and positive impacts of a project and its impacts on 
social dynamics.  
 To date, conflict assessments specifically focused on climate change impacts have 
been limited, but not nonexistent. In 2009, the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) was contracted by CARE International and Save the Children UK 
(SCUK) to conduct a study on the climate-related vulnerability and adaptive capacity of 
the Borana and Somali pastoralist communities in Ethiopia with the intent of providing 
guidance to the Government of Ethiopia, civil society organizations and international 
donors on development programming and advocacy. IISD compiled a series of “guiding 
questions” in the form of a survey as a basis for information gathering. Research included 
a 4-day training workshop and 10 days of fieldwork followed by data analysis and 
reporting. In order to answer the questions, field workers consulted with pastoral and 
agro-pastoral community groups as well as governmental and non-governmental 
organizations working with those communities. They gathered statistical data on 
population, livelihoods, geography and well-being and reviewed climate data from the 
National Meteorological Agency and FEWS NET. Additionally, a desk study gathered 
information from key documents including IPCC reports, Ethiopia’s NAPA, and UNDP’s 
Climate Change Country Profile for Ethiopia. The researchers found:  
 
To contribute to the enhancement of climate change resilience among pastoral 
and agro- pastoral communities in the Borana and Shinile zones, 
practitioners…should take into account current climate variability, projected 
climate change impacts, and climate change vulnerability and adaptation when 
developing programmes and projects.114  
 
This supports resilience as opposed to solely development to ensure that development 
projects can withstand impending negative impacts of climate change.  
Significantly, IISD not only developed an assessment tool, including the “guiding 
questions” survey and stages of information gathering, but also provided a series of seven 
components that civil society should include in programs and projects to support 
resilience. These components are not only applicable to the Borana and Somali 
populations of Ethiopia, but are a starting point for and should be considered by all NGOs 
implementing adaptation projects in communities. The sections that follow will analyze 
each component individually.  
 
CREATING PARTNERSHIPS WITH WEATHER AND CLIMATE INSTITUTIONS 
 Partnerships between civil society and weather and climate institutions supports 
information sharing between the scientific and humanitarian sectors, which is a vital but 
nearly-absent relationship in the current approach to adaptation. Generally, scientific 
approaches use solely climatic predications or general assumptions of insecurities to 
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determine what adaptation policies are suitable. In addition, scientific communities, 
although at the forefront of progress, tend to look for a one-size-fits-all solution. On the 
other hand, humanitarian organizations do not have the technology or expertise of the 
scientific community. “Such data and information could be used to plan for, and adjust 
programme interventions to ensure that the livelihoods and welfare of communities are 
safeguarded and improved in the face of current climate variability and change.”115 It is 
only through a cooperative effort that resilience can be attained.  
 
USING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND STARTING FROM WHAT PEOPLE ARE 
ALREADY DOING ON THE GROUND 
Understanding what communities and individuals are already doing to cope with 
climate change can assist in determining effectiveness and sustainability of certain coping 
strategies. In the assessment of the Borana and Somali communities, IISD found that 
communities were often forced into ineffective and unsustainable coping strategies due to 
a lack of other options, rather than based on a personal choice. By fostering participatory 
consultations in a community, NGOs can gain “insight into which community groups 
[women, men, youth and children] are vulnerable to what, and which coping strategies 
are implemented by different groups,” with the goal of developing “sustainable 
alternatives to replace ineffective or unsustainable practices.”116 
Another study of the Borana, performed in 2011 by the Climate Change 
Agriculture and Food Security Research Program of CGAIR, formerly the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research, aimed to determine what changes 
households were making to farming practices over the course of the past ten years and 
why. The study found that 62% of households surveyed made one or more changes to 
their crops in the past ten years.117 The most utilized change to the most important crop 
was an expansion of land area, consecutively followed by earlier land preparation, earlier 
planting, planting a better quality variety(ies), stopping growing crop in one season, 
introduction of intercropping, introduction of a new variety(ies) and stopping growing 
crop totally. Other changes, each undertaken by 30 households or less, included 
introduction of crop rotations, switching to a shorter cycle variety, switching to a drought 
tolerant variety and introduction of a new crop.118 There was an average of 5.16 changes 
per household to the most important crop. Despite these changes to crops, it was also 
found that more than 20% of the population suffers from food insecurity year-round and 
the first three months of the calendar year are those in which households suffer the most, 
with more than 90% suffering from food insecurity in January, 95% in February, and 20-
25% in March.119  
Based on scientific knowledge and a bottom-up approach, it can be determined 
that current coping strategies are not sufficient as the population continues to suffer 
widely from food insecurity. Undertaking a context assessment can assist NGOs in 
determining the sustainability and effectiveness of coping strategies, gather information 
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that can identify underlying factors and community-based structures and processes that 
may assist or hinder implementation of a project. 
 
UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE-LIVELIHOOD LINKAGES IN AN INTERVENTION AREA 
NGOs must not only understand which resources community members are 
dependent on for a livelihood, but which of those resources are sensitive to climate 
hazards and should be prioritized for adaptation. “Development programmes and projects 
should aim to decrease the sensitivity of these resources or should aim to decrease the 
dependence of communities on these climate-sensitive resources.”120 To date, there are 
two notable tools that have been created to analyze climate-livelihood linkages with the 
purpose of improving impacts of programmes and projects on community resilience, 
including the Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (CVCA) Framework and the 
Community-based Risk Screening Tool – Adaptation and Livelihoods (CRiSTAL). 
Identifying these linkages can assist NGOs in prioritizing projects related to the most 
vulnerable resources and livelihoods.  
 
BUILDING ON COMMUNITY SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Engaging communities to gather suggestions and recommendations is the most 
fundamental component to employing a bottom-up approach. The IISD engaged 
community groups to develop ideas for short-term coping strategies and long-term coping 
strategies. Although some ideas were common, such as migration, water infrastructure 
repair, and livelihood diversification, others were suggestions based on traditional 
community practices. These included community-based support through restocking and 
food sharing, the use of donkeys for transportation, haymaking and the establishment of 
community groups.121 Had community members not been engaged, these ideas may have 
never been placed on the table and adaptation strategies determined as suitable by 
external actors could run the risk of failure.  
  However, it must also be considered that engagement can be biased. In 
communities where women are marginalized, engaging community leaders may result in 
a lack of input from women and, therefore, produce biased and incomplete information. 
Context assessments and conflict sensitive-approaches are necessary to ensure that 
engagement is inclusive as well as appropriate for community standards and does not 
cause unintended harm. 
 
IMPROVING INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
Although community-based input provided an array of coping strategies, the IISD 
found that there were internal disagreements regarding suitable strategies.  
 
Bringing these two groups [pastoral communities] together, as well as different 
NGOs and governments who work with these communities, to share experiences 
on climate risks and different adaptation strategies, could prevent the 
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implementation of adaptation strategies that have already been shown to be 
unsustainable in the long-run and favour collaborative development of new 
adaptation strategies.122  
 
The IISD suggested that NGOs strive to facilitate information sharing between 
weather and climate institutions (such as the NMA and FEWS NET) and local 
communities to ensure timely and language-appropriate information as well as support 
the use of climate information for planning.  
In the CGAIR study of Borana, Ethiopia, researchers found that almost all 
households had not received a forecast for weather or pest and disease outbreaks. Of the 
select few that did receive forecasts, 78% received extreme weather forecasts through 
traditional sources, 23% through the radio and 2% through friends and relatives. 123 
Nearly all were able to make use of the information. Gathering this information identifies 
the most utilized sources of information and can help to identify gaps in information 
sharing.  
In another sense, a failure to disseminate knowledge to affected communities runs 
the risk of stakeholders being unaware of available coping strategies, mitigation 
techniques or even, simply, how climate may affect their livelihood. For example, 
another study of the Borana, specifically the Dire District, conducted in 2005 by Kejela 
Gemtessa, Dr. Bezabih Emana and Wktole Tiki and commissioned by the Pastoral 
Community Development Project within the Ethiopian Ministry of Federal Affairs, the 
report found that business-oriented approaches to adaptation were absent in the pastoral 
communities and may be beneficial. They found that incorporating business principles 
would “help to diversify livelihood[s]…of the pastoral community, create risk 
management mechanisms, and adjust livestock populations to rangeland and water 
resources carrying capacities.”124 
 
ADDRESSING CONSTRAINTS TO ADAPTATION AND BUILDING ON ENABLING CONDITIONS 
Through engagement with stakeholders, the IISD was able to identify the enabling 
conditions and constraints of each coping strategy. For example, migration as a coping 
strategy is enabled by the fact that young men in the community have the willingness and 
physical ability to relocate internally or internationally to find work or improved farming 
conditions. However, migration is constrained by conflicts between communities based 
on land and water resources and the limiting of livestock movement due to agricultural 
expansion. In addition, it was found that the negative effects of migration were also 
constraining factors that limited the use of this coping strategy, such as a separation of 
families and the possibility of exacerbated urban food insecurity and urban poverty 
resulting from rural-urban migration of unskilled labor. “The successful implementation 
of adaptation strategies will depend to a great extent on the ability of practitioners, 
communities and governments to address these constraints and build on existing enabling 
conditions.” 125  A failure to consider these constraints could result in increased 
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vulnerability. Because these constraints originate from a mix of local, regional and 
national conditions and policies, joint action between NGOs, local communities and 
groups, as well as regional and national officials, is necessary.126  
 
ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING DRIVERS OF VULNERABILITY 
The IISD found that the key underlying drivers of vulnerability include 
environmental degradation, population pressures, conflicts, social and gender inequalities, 
inadequate off-farm employment opportunities and skills, poor access to infrastructure, 
resources and services, weakening of the role of traditional social and governance 
institutions and inadequate government policies, coordination and capacities 127 
Addressing these underlying vulnerabilities helps to strengthen sustainability and 
increase resilience. Being that climate change is a slow process, the time for prevention is 
greater than sudden-onset crises and, therefore, while the impacts of climate change are 
already being felt, there is still time to increase resilience and sustainability. To date, the 
scientific community has led the development of adaptation and mitigation techniques. 
However, technology alone will not be sufficient. Failure to address underlying drivers of 
vulnerability undermine programs and projects or even make them impossible to 
implement.  
The study by Gemtessa, Emana and Tiki also shed light on the underlying drivers 
of vulnerability. The researchers aimed to analyze current coping strategies of various 
social groups within pastoral communities. Results of an extensive survey revealed that 
farming has been adopted to cope with food insecurity caused by declining livestock 
herds and coping strategies varied across economic groups.128  
 In addition, despite attempted coping strategies, the poor and destitute continued 
to have an average of only 2-3 food sufficient months compared to 8-12 of the medium 
and rich populations. This shows that poverty may be a driver of vulnerability as the poor 
and destitute have had to employ more coping strategies and continue to suffer 
disproportionately from food insecurity.129  
Addressing underlying drivers of vulnerability in combination with the six 
previously mentioned components provides a starting point for NGOs when undertaking 
context assessment within the context of climate change. By utilizing these techniques, 
NGOs can increase the sustainability of projects and programs, increase efficiency of 
resource and funding allocation, and increase community resilience. Comprehensive 
engagement of stakeholders is regularly identified as the key to sustainability and conflict 
sensitivity. As Heywood states, “The more stakeholder that are consulted (and consulted 
in a serious manner in which their opinions are actually given weight) the less likely it is 
for conflict between stakeholders to flare up over the final outcome of negotiations.”130 
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VI. BREAKING BARRIERS TO COOPERATION 
 
 Neither context assessment nor crisis mapping and data analysis can be utilized to 
their greatest potential without international cooperation. The key to a successful 
employment of a bottom-up approach to human security impacts of climate change lies in 
cooperation between civil society actors, primarily humanitarian and scientific 
communities, states, and international institutions. As stated at the 1992 Earth Summit, 
“Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at 
the relevant level.”131 Many have agreed that the involvement of civil society in global 
environmental governance, although it has been limited, has "enriched the process and 
strengthened outcomes" in numerous cases, as stated by Minu Hemmati, a leading 
environmental psychologist who has focused much of her work on strategies for 
sustainable development and advocacy in light of climate change. 132 "Whereas 
governmental bodies and intergovernmental organizations often lack analytical capacity 
or are hampered by bureaucratic constraints and other obligations, NGOs can focus on a 
dynamic research agenda, and move quickly to address new issues."133 
However, to date, a top-down approach continues to be applied and, as this paper 
has proven, this is not adequate. Civil society engagement is essential to employing a 
bottom-up approach but existing international structures and processes do not enable civil 
society to fulfill its role effectively.134 In addition, divergent approaches to the human 
security concept within civil society pose a barrier to a united and comprehensive 
approach to threats. Breaking these barriers could allow the interjection of human 
security concerns of climate change into the international agenda and enhance prevention 
of human insecurity stemming from climate change through cooperation between states, 
international institutions and NGOs. 
 
CONCEPTUAL BARRIERS 
Numerous organizations and social movements have lobbied states, regional 
bodies and international institutions for environmental policy reform and regulation, have 
been involved in the UNFCCC processes or have organized relevant protests. However, 
when it comes to discussions on human security and climate change, NGO involvement 
has been sparse in an already near-absent debate. 
Although the tools and expertise of humanitarian NGOs are needed to fill the gap 
in the current international approach to human security impacts of climate change, a 
divergence of approaches to human security within civil society poses as a barrier to 
international engagement. “Despite growing international concern about climate 
change...these issues have not been identified as priority areas for human security 
research.”135 
This divergence exists due to institutional processes that emphasize a hierarchy of 
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rights, prioritizing civil and political rights. Although the human security impacts of 
climate change are generally contextualized as an issue of economic, social and cultural 
rights, this paper has demonstrated that this is not the reality. Impacts of climate change 
bridge the divide between human protection and human development NGOs. Only can an 
international dialogue on human security impacts of climate change be ignited it civil 
society adopts a comprehensive approach to human security.   
 Some scholars have argued that developmental human security is altogether 
“impractical for policymaking” and therefore less endorsable at the international level.136 
This is due in part to its comprehensiveness, which limits its applicability on a global 
scale.137 Conversely, human protection is more limited and therefore, theoretically, more 
feasible.138 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is currently the most internationally-
endorsed norm of human security.139 Under R2P, states have an obligation to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing. In the case that the state cannot provide protection or is unwilling, the 
responsibility to protect lies with the international community. It is the limits of the 
applicability of the R2P norm, to only those four crimes, and the employment of a top-
down approach, that allowed it to be accepted as an international instrument.  
 It is highly unlikely that the human security impacts of climate change could be 
boiled down to a concept that would be widely accepted by the international community, 
and it may even be dangerous to attempt. Generalizing the impacts of climate change and 
taking a solely protection-based approach threatens to undermine the concept of human 
security altogether, disregard vulnerability, and ignore the role of civil society actors. 
Unfortunately, NGOs employing an empowerment approach are not as welcomed 
into international dialogue because of a continued debate on how these economic, social 
and cultural rights can and should be fulfilled, how to measures progress, who is to be 
held accountable and what accountability mechanisms exist to ensure that they are 
upheld. Due to ambiguity and disagreement, these rights have remained secondary to 
civil and political rights on the international agenda. 
It has been demonstrated that empowerment and protection are mutually 
reinforcing aspects of human insecurity prevention. A convergence of approaches within 
civil society would stress the importance of human security impacts from climate change. 
It would open the door for NGOs employing a protection approach to interject 
comprehensive human security concerns into international dialogue and begin the first 
steps towards a cooperative effort between civil society, states and international 
institutions. It would also serve to mutually reinforce the protection-oriented approach of 
states and international institutions. Cooperation from states and international institutions 
is needed to make this a reality.  
If the two approaches fail to converge within civil society, the importance of 
empowerment will remain absent from the international agenda and the human security 
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implications of climate change on both protection and development will increasingly 
grow.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS 
 Firstly, NGO participation in global environmental governance is limited by 
institutional barriers. Although NGOs can acquire consultative status at the UN, their 
participation in negotiations and dialogues is limited and they are usually prohibited from 
putting items on the agenda. With regard to climate change negotiations specifically, 
NGOs are occasionally granted access to Convention of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC 
as observers. However, the same limitations exist. NGO engagement depends primarily 
on the willingness of states and international institutions to actively include NGOs in 
processes. If NGOs, or an international institution representing NGOs, cannot put items 
on the agenda nor actively voice their concerns, it is unlikely that a bottom-up approach 
will make headway in the international community.  
 To date, international institutions, such as the UN and the World Bank, and 
governmental agencies, including USAID and DfID, have taken the lead in addressing 
human security impacts of climate change, although not nearly to the extent necessary 
and, generally, through the use of a top-down or state-centric approach. Agenda 21 of the 
1992 Earth Summit called on intergovernmental organizations, such as the 
aforementioned, to provide channels for NGOs “to contribute to policy design, decision-
making, implementation and evaluation of IGO activities.” Therefore, international 
institutions and government agencies must take the lead in applying a human security 
lens to climate change and engaging NGOs in policymaking, implementation and 
decision-making. The expertise, experience and tools necessary to employ a bottom-up 
approach and strengthen preventive efforts lie within civil society. "Enabling the 
constructive participation of civil society in global environmental governance is thus one 
of the most important tasks for policymakers concerned with the effectiveness of global 
governance," and is critical for achieving sustainable development goals.140 
 The second barrier to NGO engagement that must be addressed is under- or mis-
representation. Certain NGOs simply do not have the access, resources or means to 
engage with international institutions or states on issues of climate change. In particular, 
NGOs from the global south are underrepresented at the international level. This results 
in powerful groups, those originating in developed countries, having disproportional 
leverage, especially since developed countries are less vulnerable. With vulnerable 
populations primarily located in developing countries, imbalanced representation at the 
international level threatens to undermine the human security concerns of particular 
populations- some of whose lives are already threatened. Policies and initiatives will not 
accurately reflect the needs of global society.  
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COOPERATION 
 Both of these barriers can be addressed if NGOs begin to work collectively to 
interject human security concerns into the international dialogue, if international 
institutions are open to engagement with NGOs and if all actors uphold mandates of 
protection. "The international community has begun to recognize that effective global 
action requires meaningful stakeholder involvement in international policymaking and 
implementation." 141  Historically, the UN has partnered with NGOs to assist in 
implementation of programs, focused primarily on emergency humanitarian response, 
civil and political human rights and election monitoring.142 It is time for this cooperative 
effort to broaden to other fields and reflect the changing dynamics of a globalized world. 
"NGOs and other civil society groups are not only stakeholders in governance, but also a 
driving force behind greater international cooperation."143 
 In a truly cooperative international system, international, national and civil society 
actors could work together to strengthen effectiveness of global environmental 
governance, increase efficiency of response to crises and ultimately strengthen 
prevention. An ideal system would include implementers, regulators, funders, and 
information gatherers, analysts and sources.  
 Although this merely illustrates a model of cooperation, striving for the 
fundamental purpose of this model (the coordinated exchange of information and 
resources) can greatly benefit the current international approach to human security 
impacts of climate change.  
 Utilizing the tools of civil society, such as crisis mapping and context assessments 
that foster a bottom-up approach, can strengthen this approach and fill in the gaps in the 
current system.  
 This proposed model is a means through which to centralize human security 
efforts and foster information sharing in a decentralized international community, and is 
also idealistic, but encourages the international community take small steps towards a 
worthy achievement, each step advancing vital preventive efforts.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION   
 
Climate change poses a threat to each and every human being. For some, this 
threat is already a daunting reality. For others, ignorance will not serve them well in the 
future. Climate change is not something we can ignore in the hopes that it will disappear 
with time. It is here and the time to act is now.  
Traditionally, the international community has played a reactive role in 
addressing threats to human security. As this is an unprecedented threat that all nations 
face, this is an opportunity to act collectively and live up to the mandates of prevention 
that states and international institutions have emphasized for so many decades.   Climate 
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change is not a traditional sudden-onset threat, but rather a slow process that gives us 
more time to act- but time is running out. 
To date, the international community has failed to take preventive action due to a 
top-down approach that emphasizes mitigation. The vital components of resilience and 
adaptation are absent from this strategy but can be provided through engagement with 
civil society actors that employ a bottom-up approach to human security threats. Before it 
is too late, states, international institutions, civil society, the private sector and individuals 
must cooperate to address the human security impacts of climate change that are already 
effecting vulnerable populations. Within civil society, humanitarian NGOs must 
collectively adopt a comprehensive approach to human security, merging the human 
protection and human development components. NGOs have the power to implore action 
from states and international institutions and the tools to foster a preventive approach to 
human insecurity. Cooperation is the key. No single actor has the tools, knowledge, or 
resources to address climate change on their own. A cooperative strategy will allow for 
greater effectiveness and efficiency, and, in turn, prevention.  
If we wish to leave this planet as a safe environment for future generations, we 
must realize that it is not Africa that is threatened by climate change, it is not low-lying 
states- It is each and every one of us. Only collectively can we ensure prevention.  
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